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Four	things	to	watch	ahead	of	North	Macedonia’s
elections
North	Macedonia	will	hold	parliamentary	elections	today.	Alejandro	Esteso	Pérez	explains	that	with
tense	coalition	negotiations	expected,	the	country’s	progress	toward	European	integration,	the	ability
of	the	new	government	to	restore	trust	in	public	institutions,	and	the	fallout	from	the	Covid-19	outbreak
will	all	be	key	issues	to	watch	following	the	vote.
North	Macedonia	will	go	to	the	polls	today.	Initially	planned	for	12	April,	the	snap	parliamentary
elections	were	postponed	due	to	the	Covid-19	pandemic.	Against	the	backdrop	of	the	country’s	highly	ethnicised
multi-party	system,	two	main	political	groups	are	vying	for	electoral	victory.
On	the	one	hand,	there	is	the	centre-left	SDSM,	in	power	since	2017	under	the	leadership	of	Prime	Minister	Zoran
Zaev.	On	the	other,	there	is	the	nationalist-conservative	VMRO-DPMNE,	which	led	the	government	between	2006
and	2016	under	the	rule	of	Nikola	Gruevski.	Alongside	the	two	main	groups,	the	interests	of	North	Macedonia’s
Albanian	community,	around	25	per	cent	of	the	population,	are	represented	by	several	minor	parties	that	are
attempting	to	take	a	leading	position	within	their	ethnic	group.
After	a	decades-long	record	of	entrenched	corruption	and	a	dramatic	demographic	exodus,	and	with	a	disputed
European	path	and	the	novel	threat	of	Covid-19	looming	over	the	country’s	politics,	North	Macedonia’s	future	is
fragile.	With	all	that	is	at	stake	ahead	of	the	election,	there	are	at	least	four	major	uncertainties	that	are	likely	to
come	to	the	fore	once	the	results	are	announced.
Who	will	win	the	support	of	the	‘kingmaker’?
Pre-election	polls	are	unequivocally	pointing	toward	a	highly	polarised	scenario	where	neither	the	SDSM	nor
VMRO-DPMNE	will	manage	to	garner	a	clear	majority	of	votes	–	something	that	is	far	from	rare	in	the	country’s
politics.	These	two	organisations	have	traditionally	relied	on	smaller	ethnic	Albanian	parties	as	junior	coalition
partners	in	order	to	attain	parliamentary	majorities,	with	the	Democratic	Union	for	Integration	(DUI)	being	the	largest
party	of	this	nature.	The	DUI	has	previously	backed	various	left-leaning	and	right-leaning	governments	over	the
years,	profiting	from	its	role	as	a	kingmaker.
On	this	occasion,	the	outcome	is	bound	to	be	no	different.	Over	the	last	term,	the	SDSM	and	VMRO-DPMNE	have
developed	differentiated	ideological	portrayals	that	have	led	to	a	strong	domestic	political	polarisation,	particularly	at
a	rhetorical	level.	This	has	certainly	not	helped	to	lay	the	foundations	for	broad	parliamentary	consensus.
In	this	context,	the	DUI	is	expected	to	become,	yet	again,	North	Macedonia’s	powerbroker.	Aware	of	its	leverage,
the	party	has	based	its	campaign	on	demanding	the	country’s	first	ethnic	Albanian	Prime	Minister,	a	condition	it	has
put	forward	as	a	prerequisite	for	entering	a	coalition	with	either	the	SDSM	or	VMRO-DPMNE.	While	this	demand	is
unlikely	to	be	fulfilled	in	reality,	the	expected	coalition	negotiations	are	bound	to	entail	political	concessions	and
controversial	commitments,	which	will	probably	add	up	to	the	already	tense	state	of	affairs.
Is	North	Macedonia	now	at	peace	with	Greece?
North	Macedonia’s	path	toward	membership	of	NATO	and	the	EU	has	proven	difficult	since	the	country’s
independence	in	1991.	The	main	obstacle	to	a	smooth	integration	process	has	been	the	‘name’	dispute	with
Greece,	which	had	systematically	blocked	Skopje’s	successive	attempts	for	accession.
It	was	not	until	2017	that,	in	an	effort	to	overcome	the	Greek	veto	and	attain	a	solution	to	the	dispute,	the	Zaev
government	resumed	negotiations	with	its	counterpart	in	Athens,	the	Syriza	government	led	by	Alexis	Tsipras.
Several	rounds	of	meetings	ensued	until	a	deal	was	reached	and	the	so-called	Prespa	Agreement	was	ratified.
Under	the	agreement,	the	‘Former	Yugoslav	Republic	of	Macedonia’	(FYROM)	would	be	renamed	‘North
Macedonia’.
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Greece	subsequently	pledged	to	drop	its	opposition	to	Skopje’s	accession	aspirations.	This	allowed	North
Macedonia	to	access	NATO	as	its	thirtieth	member	in	March	this	year.	Around	the	same	time,	the	EU27	gave	a
green	light	to	launching	enlargement	negotiations	with	Skopje,	a	commitment	that	had	been	pending	for	almost	two
years	since	the	signing	of	the	deal.
Zoran	Zaev,	Prime	Minister	of	North	Macedonia,	with	NATO	Secretary	General	Jens	Stoltenberg,	Credit:	NATO	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
At	home,	the	road	to	signing	the	Prespa	Agreement	was	not	immune	to	controversy.	The	public	was	heavily	divided
on	the	issue	of	the	country	undergoing	a	name	change	in	return	for	Greece	dropping	its	veto.	As	the	largest	party	in
opposition,	VMRO-DPMNE	stood	out	as	the	most	outspoken	challenger	of	the	deal	with	Athens	–	a	position	that
became	even	more	assertive	following	a	government-promoted	referendum	that	did	not	meet	the	participation
threshold	and	was	thus	deemed	illegitimate.
Two	years	after	the	deal	was	struck,	North	Macedonia’s	compliance	is	still	at	stake.	While	the	SDSM	is	bidding	for	a
continuation	of	the	Prespa	framework,	which	has	thus	far	allowed	the	country	to	make	substantive	advances	toward
European	integration,	VMRO-DPMNE	embodies	a	revisionist	view	that	could	lead	to	the	reconsideration	or
modification	of	the	agreement.	North	Macedonia’s	proactive	European	perspective	could	thus	be	in	jeopardy	and
the	country’s	accession	process	may	slow	if	VMRO-DPMNE	obtains	the	upper	hand	in	the	elections.
Is	the	restoration	of	trust	in	public	institutions	possible?
The	decade	of	Gruevski-led	VMRO-DPMNE	rule	that	preceded	Zaev’s	term	in	office	was	heavily	stained	by	the
perception	of	corruption	and	state	capture.	The	public	image	of	the	judiciary,	political	parties	and	public	institutions
was	heavily	damaged	and	in	urgent	need	of	restoration,	something	that	the	SDSM	pledged	to	solve	when	it	entered
into	government	in	2017.
In	the	end,	however,	what	was	perceived	as	a	hopeful	return	to	the	rule	of	law	in	the	eyes	of	the	public	ended	up	as
a	disappointing	perpetuation	of	the	status	quo.	The	most	recent	example	was	the	fall	from	grace	of	the	Special
Prosecution	Office	(SPO),	an	ad	hoc	body	constituted	in	2015	with	the	task	of	investigating	high-level	political	crime
and	whose	seeming	transparency	and	credibility	had	rendered	it	a	highly-trusted	institution.	Its	head,	Katica	Janeva,
was	recently	found	guilty	of	the	misuse	of	public	office.	Termed	the	‘Extortion’	case,	the	scandal	has	shaken	the
country	and	the	reputational	damage	stretches	as	far	as	Zaev	himself.
The	election	results	will	likely	reflect	how	poorly	the	public	perceive	Zaev	to	have	handled	corruption	during	his
three	years	in	office	–	the	issue	has	formed	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	VMRO-DPMNE’s	campaign	against	his
reelection.	Formerly	supportive	segments	of	the	electorate	now	appear	disenchanted	by	the	SDSM	and	may	well
switch	their	vote	to	another	party	or,	as	will	most	likely	be	the	case,	join	the	many	others	who	choose	to	abstain
from	voting	at	all	–	a	dangerous	sign	of	disenfranchisement	from	the	political	process.
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What	about	Covid-19?
North	Macedonia	is	currently	facing	an	aggressive	upsurge	in	Covid-19	cases.	After	a	modest	first	wave	was
stemmed	by	strict	lockdown	measures	and	curfews,	the	country	is	now	seeing	a	resurgence.	The	elections	risk
contributing	to	a	further	uptick	in	cases.	There	were	sharp	disagreements	between	the	main	political	parties	during
the	negotiations	over	the	election	date:	while	the	SDSM	had	consistently	argued	for	a	date	in	June,	VMRO-DPMNE
considered	this	too	dangerous	and	pushed	for	a	later	date.	An	agreement	over	the	final	July	date	was	not	reached
until	mid-June.
While	the	management	of	the	most	immediate	consequences	of	the	outbreak	will	likely	coincide	with	the	parties
holding	coalition	talks,	the	country’s	rebuilding	efforts	after	the	pandemic	are	set	to	be	headed	by	the	winning
alliance.	Consensus	and	partisan	understanding	will	have	to	prevail	for	effective	measures	to	be	implemented
safely.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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